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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Two-person common interest games are defined as games with a strongly Pareto dominant payoff 
vector (Aumann & Sorin, 1989).  If the game is repeated infinitely often, and if the players are patient, 
it might be expected that they would be able to coordinate and receive average payoffs close to the 
dominant payoff vector.  It is, however, an implication of the Folk theorem for repeated games that 
there exist equilibria in which patient players receive payoffs substantially below the dominant payoff 
vector.  Moreover, even imposing subgame perfection does not alter this general result (Fudenberg 
and Maskin, 1986).  That such inefficient equilibria can survive in the long run when players are very 
patient seems counter-intuitive, and in this paper we shall investigate whether perfection, when applied 
to a simple "reputation" model, can lead to such undesirable equilibria being eliminated. 
   Specifically, we shall consider perturbing a common interest game with (only) the possibility 
that one of the players, say player 1, might be a type committed to playing a cooperative action, that 
is, the action corresponding to the dominant payoff vector.  The other player, player 2, is unsure of 
player 1's type.  This will allow the possibility of a reputation effect, where player 1 can mimic the 
commitment strategy (of always playing the cooperative action) in the hope of convincing player 2 of 
her cooperative intentions. The question we address is: will this form of incomplete information allow 
us to rule out at least the most undesirable equilibria as the players become very patient?  If the 
equilibrium concept is that of Nash equilibrium, the answer is negative1.  We shall consider whether 
reputation arguments might nevertheless have a degree of power when the equilibrium concept is 
refined to incorporate some notion of perfectness.  Our results will show that the answer to the 
question is still negative, in that a small perturbation of the original common interest game has little 
effect on the attainable equilibria, and extremely undesirable equilibria still exist. 
In fact, if attention is restricted to pure strategy equilibria, imposing perfection does lead to 
payoffs close to the Pareto dominant pair.  If a pure-strategy equilibrium leads to payoffs substantially 
below the Pareto-dominant ("cooperative") payoff pair, then there must be periods in which one or 
                                                   
1Even the assumption of two-sided uncertainty of the type we assume does not force cooperation in Nash 
equilibrium.  Aumann & Sorin (1989) construct a mixed-strategy counter example (to their main result, which 
assumes pure strategies) in which cooperation is not approximated as the players become patient. 2 
both players do not play the cooperative actions.  If, in the first period this occurs, player 1 is 
supposed to play noncooperatively, then by cooperating instead she will establish a reputation for 
being the commitment type, and cooperative payoffs are guaranteed thereafter; hence not cooperating 
cannot be an equilibrium strategy.  It must therefore be player 2 who is first supposed to play 
noncooperatively, and in a Nash equillibrium this can be enforced by severe off-the-equilibrium-path 
punishments by player 1.  But suppose that we impose perfection  on the equilibrium.  To punish 
player 2, player 1 must, at some point, play non-cooperatively.  By not doing so, however, she will 
establish a reputation for being the commitment type and hence guarantee herself the cooperative 
payoff thereafter.  Roughly speaking, player 1 cannot credibly punish because she can always "hide 
behind" the possibility of being the commitment type (and has every incentive to do so).2   Our reason 
for studying common interest games is that in this class of games this argument seems to be most 
powerful, and so reputation has the best opportunity to work effectively.   
We show, however, that if mixed strategies are permitted, then credible and severe 
punishments are still possible.  Our main result, Proposition 3, establishes that in a wide class of 
repeated common interest games, as discounting goes to zero and as the prior probability attached to 
the commitment type goes to zero, the normal type of player 1 can be driven close to her minmax 
payoff.  Hence this is a continuity result with the complete information game as the probability of the 
perturbation goes to zero.  Mixed strategies play an important role in the construction because a 
randomization by the normal type of player 1 between the cooperative and some other action, can 
allow her to credibly punish player 2 if the latter deviates.  Specifically, if she randomises and player 2 
deviates, there is a probability that player 2 deviates simultaneously with player 1 revealing herself to 
be the normal type; if this happens, the continuation game is a complete information game where 
severe punishments are credible.  Moreover, an equilibrium in which player 1 puts positive probability 
on an action other than the cooperative one, need not imply that she receives a continuation payoff 
equal to the cooperation payoff, should she play the cooperative action.  In that case, player 2 will 
                                                   
2 Formally, it is easy to establish that for a fixed probability of the commitment type, and for a given e, there is a 
threshold discount factor above which all pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs are within e of the 
dominant payoff pair.  It should be noted, however, that this depends on the assumption that the perturbation 
only involves the above described automaton. 3 
revise upwards the probability he attaches to facing the commitment type, but not to one, so the 
continuation payoff need not equal the cooperation payoff.  Consequently punishment can be 
threatened by player 1 in a way which does not imply cooperation payoffs thereafter.  
Although this result is, in the context of the reputation literature, a negative one, we see it 
additionally as a first step towards investigating perfect equilibria in general incomplete information 
games.  This is of interest because, to our knowledge, nothing is known about general properties of 
the equilibrium payoff set (Nash or perfect) of general discounted incomplete information games as 
discounting becomes small.3   This is in contrast to the undiscounted case where complete 
characterizations exist, although only for Nash equilibria (see Forges, 1992).  
 
2.  THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
We begin by describing a broad class of common interest games.  When these games are infinitely 
repeated, with both players discounting the future with the same factor d (0<d<1), there is a large set 
of possible equilibrium outcomes.  In particular, given any pair (g1,g2) of feasible strictly individually 
rational payoffs, there is a discount factor d such that for all d>d there exists a subgame perfect 
equilibrium with the payoffs (g1,g2).  The repeated common interest games we consider are then 
perturbed so that player 1 is either a "normal" type, or a commitment type, hereafter "automaton", that 
always plays the Pareto optimal action.  Player 2 has prior beliefs that attach a probability m to player 
1 being the automaton and a probability 1-m to her being a normal type.  In our main result, 
Proposition 3, we show that given any w>0, there exists a d (0<d<1) and m>0 such that for any d>d 
and m<m there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the normal type receives a payoff within w of 
her minmax payoff.   
 
2.1.  A Class of Common Interest Games 
                                                   
3 Bergin (1989) shows that sequential equilibria have a Markov property; unfortunately this result does not 
directly have bearing upon the set of payoffs which can be realised in equilibrium.  The same can be said for the 
results of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Jordan (1995) who have studied the long-run properties of equilibrium play 
in contexts more general than the current one. 4 
In this subsection we shall describe the class of common interest games that are studied in this paper.  
First we define some notation.  A finite 2-player game in strategic form is denoted by 
    g = (g1,g2) : A1 x A2 ˘ R2, 
where Ai is player i's finite action space (we assume #Ai =2, i=1, 2) and gi is player i's payoff function, 
i=1,2.  Let  a:=(a1,a2) denote an action profile for the two players and A:=A1xA2 be the set of all 
action profiles. The convex hull of all payoffs is the set G:=co{ (g1(a),g2(a)) | a￿A }.4   Let M be a 
positive number that bounds the payoffs of the players: M=|gi(a)| for all a￿A, i=1,2.  Also let the pair 
(g
1,g
2) denote the players' minmax payoffs: 
    g
i := 
min
aj
max
ai
Eai ,a jgi(a1,a2),      j„ i, i =1,2,
  
where ai is a mixed action for player i.  Define the set of feasible and strictly individually rational 
payoffs to be G* := G«{ (g1,g2)￿R2 | g1>g
1,  g2>g
2}. 
  We consider a class of common interest games, that is a class of games with a strongly Pareto 
dominant payoff  pair (Aumann and Sorin (1989)), although we shall restrict attention to games in 
which the payoff vector to one pair of actions  strictly Pareto dominates all others.  Let (a1*,a2*)￿A 
denote the action pair corresponding to the Pareto dominant pair, that is g1*:=g1(a1*,a2*) > g1(a) and 
g2*:=g2(a1*,a2*)>g2(a) for all a￿A where a?(a1*,a2*).  We make three assumptions about the 
structure of the payoffs.  These assumptions place some limits on the generality of our results but 
simplify the arguments considerably.5 
(i)  Let A2ˆA2 be the set of actions for player 2 that give player 1 no more than g
1 if she plays her 
Pareto optimal action:  A2:= {a2￿A2 | g1(a1*,a2)= g
1 }.  (By the definition of g
1 the set A2  is non-
empty.)  The set A2 could be interpreted as the set of possible punishments for player 1 if she is 
playing a1*.  The first assumption we make is that action a1* is not always the unique best response to 
an action in A2;  that is, for some â2￿A2, there exists â1?a1* such that 
                                                   
4 co(X) denotes the convex hull of the set X. 
5 Assumption (ii) can be relaxed at the cost of some additional complications and an appropriate reformulation of 
Proposition 3.  Assumption (iii) is also not essential; the case where the feasible set is one-dimensional was 
treated in an earlier version, although some of the constructions needed differ.  We conjecture that assumption 
(i) is likewise inessential, although we have not proved this. 5 
(1)   g1(â1,â2) = g1(a1,â2),   for all a1￿A1. 
A sufficient (though by no means necessary) condition for this is if action a1* does not ensure player 1 
her minmax payoff in the game, that is if min a2˛A2g1(a1*,a2)<g
1.  Henceforth (â1,â2) will refer to a 
fixed action pair, with  â1?a 1* and â2￿A2, which satisfies (1).  The payoffs when actions (â1,â2) are 
taken will be denoted g
1:=g1(â1,â2), g
2:=g2(â1,â2).   
(ii)  Our second assumption is that there exists feasible and individually rational payoffs that hold both 
players down to their minmax levels.  That is,  
(2)  $  (g
1i,g
2i)￿G such that  (a)  g
ii=g
i,        (b)  g
ji=g
j, i=1,2, j?i. 
(iii)  Our third assumption is that the set G* has a non-empty interior.   
[Figure 1 about here] 
Given the second and third assumptions above, the set G has the form shown in Figure 1.  The dashed 
line between (g
11,g
21) (see (2)) and (g1*,g2*) will be used in the construction of an equilibrium.  This 
line will be described by the equation g2 = a+bg1, where b>0. 
 
2.2.  The Repeated Game of Complete Information 
The game in strategic form described above is played in the periods t=0,1,2,... .  In each period, 
players are aware of all (pure) actions taken in previous periods.  Player i's payoff in this infinitely 
repeated game is given by the expected discounted sum of its normalized stage-game payoffs, E(1-
d)St=0
￿
 dtgi(a1
t,a2
t) (i=1,2), where at:=(a1
t,a2
t)￿A is the players' action profile in period t, d is their 
common discount factor (0<d<1), and E denotes expectations.  We will let G(d) denote the infinitely 
repeated game of complete information.  Given our assumptions on the structure of payoffs in the 
stage game, the Perfect Folk Theorem applies to G(d) provided d is sufficiently close to one.  By 
Fudenberg & Maskin (1991) the following result holds for the repeated game of complete information 
G(d) when only pure strategies are observed and there is no public randomisation. 6 
   Result 1 (Fudenberg & Maskin (1991)) : For any  (g1,g2)￿G* there exists  d<1 such 
that for all  1>d>d there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of  G(d) in which player i's average 
payoff is  gi. 
In general, the lower bound d in Result 1 will vary with the point (g1,g2)￿G* that is being sustained as 
the equilibrium payoff vector.  This is because the threshold d varies with the threat point 
(g1',g2')<(g1,g2) used in the proof.  By considering those payoff pairs (g1,g2)￿G* that can be 
supported as equilibrium payoffs using a fixed threat point (g1',g2'), the following corollary to Result 1 
is immediate. 
   Corollary : Let  e>0 be given, and define Ge*:=G«{ (g1,g2)￿R2 | g1=g
1+e, g2=g
2+be }; 
then provided Ge* is non-empty,there is a  de<1 such that for all  de<d<1 and any  
(g1,g2)￿Ge* there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of  G(d) in which player i's average payoff 
is  gi. 
(Recall that the parameter b>0 is the slope of the dashed line in Figure 1.) 
 
2.3.  The Perturbed Repeated Game  
We now introduce a perturbation of the repeated game of common interests G(d) described above.  
Before the play commences there is a move of nature, the outcome of which is not observed by player 
2.  With probability 1-m, nature selects player 1 to be a type with payoffs as described above, and 
with probability m, nature selects a player 1 to be a type that always plays action a1* independently of 
history.  We will call the first type of player 1 "the normal type" and the second type of player 1 "the 
automaton".  As player 2 does not observe nature's move, this gives a repeated game of one-sided 
incomplete information which we will denote G(m, d) and we will study the perfect Bayesian equilibria 
(PBE's) of this game.6  
                                                   
6 The automaton can also be thought of as a type with a standard payoff matrix in which the payoffs in the 
row corresponding to a1* are all equal and strictly greater than all other payoffs.  At a PBE this type will play 
a1* after every history, including those off the equilibrium path. 7 
  We adopt the definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium given by Fudenberg & Tirole 
(1991a), which in this context amounts to the following.  If ht is any history of actions taken by both 
players up to and including period t, then given player 2's beliefs about facing the automaton, say 
m(ht), at the start of period t+1, strategies must yield a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the continuation 
game.7  Moreover Bayes' rule is used to update beliefs whenever possible, that is, m(ht+1) is derived 
from m(ht) by Bayes' rule whenever player 1 plays an action at period t which player 2 had expected 
to be played with positive probability.  
  Proposition 1 exploits the natural recursive structure of the repeated games of incomplete 
information G(m, d) to determine a relationship between a PBE of G(m, d) and a PBE of G(pm, d) 
where p<1.  The principal idea of the proof is very simple.  It takes as given a PBE of G(m, d) with 
payoffs (g1, g2) to the normal type and player 2 respectively, and uses this PBE to construct a PBE of 
G(pm, d).  In the first period of play in G(pm, d) the normal type of player 1 randomises, playing a1* 
with probability q = p(1-m)/(1-pm) and â1 with probability 1-q (where â1 is defined below (1)).  
Player 2 plays â2 in the first period.  Conditional upon observing a1* in the first period, player 2 will 
revise his priors (about player 1 being an automaton) by Bayes's Theorem to precisely p (given our 
choice of q).  Thus if (a1*, â2) is played in the first period, we specify that the PBE of G(m, d) is then 
played out subsequently, with payoffs (g1, g2).  In this case the expected payoff to the normal type is 
(1-d)g1(a1*, â2)+dg1.  In order for randomization for the normal type to be optimal in the first period, 
she must be indifferent between this payoff and what she would receive from playing â1 in the first 
period.   After the first period history (â1, â2), however, she reveals herself to be the normal type, so 
the players are in the complete information game G(d).  Thus it is necessary that an equilibrium of 
G(d) can be chosen which makes player 1 indifferent (this equilibrium can also be used as the 
continuation after all actions of player 1 other than a1* since â1 is a best response to â2, so the normal 
type will not wish to deviate).  In addition, the continuation equilibrium must be selected so that it is 
                                                   
7 The reader is referred to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a, 1991b) for formal definitions of all equilibrium concepts 
used here.  For the purpose of the definitions, the automaton should be interpreted as a payoff-matrix type as 
described in footnote 6; the strategy of such a type in a PBE must be identical to the automaton strategy.  This is 
in contrast to a Nash equilibrium where the payoff-matrix type need only follow the commitment strategy on the 
equilibrium path.  In the equilibria we construct, beliefs off-the-equilibrium path put probability zero on the 
automaton if player 1 has deviated from a1* in the past, which is consistent with the idea of an automaton which 
cannot deviate.   8 
optimal for player 2 to choose â2 in the first period; this requires that another equilibrium of G(d) can 
be chosen as the continuation after (â1, a2
0
) where a2
0
?â2 , which is sufficiently severe to prevent 
player 2 from deviating.  Provided these two equilibria can be constructed, a PBE of G(pm,d)  has 
been found with the payoff (1-d)g1(a1*, â2)+dg1 to the normal type.  Since by construction 
g1(a1*, â2) = g
1, it follows that the equilibrium of G(pm,d) has a lower payoff for the normal type than 
the equilibrium of G(m,d), a property that will, by repeated application of Proposition 1, permit the 
construction of a PBE with payoffs for the normal type arbitrary close to her minmax payoff. 
  Define  e > 0 to be such that Ge* is nonempty.  Then we can state: 
   Proposition 1:  Let  e, 0 < e < e , and  d>de be given .  Also let  (g1,g2) be the expected 
payoffs to the normal type of player 1 and to player 2 at a PBE for  G(m,d). Then  G(pm,d) has 
a PBE where the normal type of player 1 receives the expected payoff  (1-d)g1(a1*, â2) +dg1 
provided p (with 0<p<1) and g1 satisfy 
(3)     g1  =  g
1 + (1-d)d-1( g
1 - g1(a1*, â2)+2M) + e, 
(4)   
p
 1-p 
   Š   
 d(a+bg 1-g2-be) - (1-d) g2*-g2+b g1-g1(a1*,a2)  
  (1-d)(g2*-g2(a1*, a2))  
 
 . 
 
Proof: See Appendix. 
  The above proposition allows us to generate an equilibrium for G(pm, d) using an equilibrium 
of G(m, d), provided the bounds (3) and (4) on g1 and p are satisfied.  Proposition 2 below 
repeatedly applies Proposition 1.  The first step is to describe a PBE for G(1, d), which is the 
complete information game between player 2 and the automaton.  Player 2's best response to the 
automaton is to play the action a1* in every period, so in G(1, d) there is a PBE where the players 
play (a1*,a2*) in every period.  This equilibrium is used as a starting point for repeated applications of 
Proposition 1.  The next step is to apply Proposition 1 to this PBE to find a PBE for G(p1, d) (where 
p1<1); at this PBE player 2 plays â2 for one period and then G(1, d) is played if a1
0=a1*.  The whole 
process can be repeated by applying Proposition 1 to the PBE of G(p1, d) to find a new PBE for 
G(p1p2, d) (where p2<1); at this PBE â2 is played for two periods before play settles on (a1*,a2*) in 9 
G(1, d).  Proposition 2 repeatedly applies Proposition 1 in this fashion until some step N(d)+1 where 
the constraint (3) is finally violated.  At this last equilibrium â2 is played N(d)+1 periods against the 
automaton, and in period N(d)+2 play finally settles on (a1*,a2*).  The process described above thus 
generates a finite family of equilibria for the sequence of games G(m, d) with priors m=1˚p1˚p2...pn-
1˚pn,  n=0, 1, ”, N(d)+1. 
  The PBE desribed in Proposition 2 is parameterised by three sequences: {gn}n=0
N(d)
 , {pn}n=0
N(d)
  
and {mn}n=0
N(d)
 .  The terms of all of these sequences depend on d, although this dependence is 
suppressed in the notation.  The sequences will be defined inductively, because Proposition 1 
describes a relationship between their adjacent terms.  Suppose we have found an equilibrium for the 
game G(mn,d), where player 1's normal type has an expected payoff of gn; then Proposition 1 
determines an equilibrium for the game G(mn+1,d) (where mn+1=mnpn+1) where player 1's normal 
type gets the payoff gn+1=(1-d)g1(a1*,â2) + dgn.  Thus, given the pair (gn,mn), Proposition 1 
determines the parameters (gn+1,mn+1,pn+1).  The initial values of these sequences are determined so 
g0 is player 1's equilibrium payoff at the equilibrium of G(1,d) described above: m0=1, g0=g1*.  The 
following recursion describes how the successive terms (gn+1,mn+1,pn+1) are generated: 
(5)          gn+1  =  (1-d)g1(a1*,â2) + dgn, 
(6)          mn+1  =  mnpn+1, 
(7) 
pn+1
 1-pn+1 
   =   
 d(a+bg
 n-g2-be) - (1-d) g2*-g2+b g1-g1(a1*,a2)  
  (1-d)(g2*-g2(a1*,a2))  
 
. 
 
   Proposition 2:  Let  e, 0 < e < e , and  d>de be given and let  N(d) be the  largest positive 
integer  (if one exists) such that 
(8)    (1-dN(d))g1(a1*,â2)+dN(d)g1*  =  g
1 + (1-d)d-1( g
1 - g1(a1*,â2)) + e. 
Then for  n=1,2,...,N(d)+1, if  m=mn there exists  a PBE of G(m, d) where the normal type of 
player 1's payoff is  gn.  10 
Proof:  We have shown that g0=g1* is a PBE payoff for the normal type of player 1 in G(1, d).  It is 
also true that g1* is a PBE payoff for the normal type of player 1 in G(m, d) for all m.  Thus the 
proposition is true when n=0.  Now suppose the proposition is true for n=n' where n'=N(d).  As the 
proposition is true for n=n', the game G(mn', d) has a PBE where the normal type of player 1 receives 
the payoff gn'=(1-dn')g1(a1*,â2)+dn'g1*.  Apply Proposition 1 to this equilibrium; gn' satisfies (3) 
because n'=N(d).  Set g1=gn' in (4).  The largest value for p that satisfies (4) will solve (4) with 
equality.  This defines pn'+1 as in (7).  Hence from Proposition 1, if m=mn'+1=pn'+1mn' the game 
G(m, d) has a PBE where the normal type's payoff is gn'+1=(1-d)g1(a1*,â2)+dgn'.  Q.E.D. 
  Proposition 2 goes a long way towards achieving the result described in the introduction, 
because it shows that for any d we can find a m such that the game G(m, d) has a PBE where the 
normal type gets approximately g
1+(1-d)d-1(g
1-g1(a1*,â2))+e.  As d becomes close to unity, 
therefore, the normal type's payoff can be made within e of her minmax level g
1.  We want a stronger 
result, however, so that given e, there are threshold values for d and for m such that for all  d bigger 
than its threshold value and all  m less than its (strictly positive) threshold value, equilibrium payoffs 
within e of g
1 exist.  It is therefore necessary that we consider how the family of equilibria described in 
Proposition 2 varies as d approaches unity for a given value e>0.  The equilibrium payoffs in 
Proposition 2 define a piecewise continuous function g
d(m) where g
d(m)=gn for mn+1<m=mn.  The 
function g
d(m) describes how the payoffs at the PBE we construct are related to the priors.  The 
sequence {mn,gn}n=0
N(d)
 determines the properties of the function g
d(m) and these are both shown in 
Figure 2. (The line labelled gd is referred to in the proof of Lemma 1.)  We are particularly interested 
in how g
d(m) behaves as d˘1, and as this happens the figure changes in two ways.  First, N(d) 
becomes arbitrarily large and each individual line segment becomes arbitrarily short.  Secondly, the 
points (mn,gn) become closer together, with  ||(mn,gn) - (mn+1,gn+1)||˘0, and so the step sizes shrink.  
The following technical lemma shows that on the interval (0,1] the step function in the picture 
converges uniformly to a continuous function g*(m).  Moreover, this limiting function g*(m) is 
continuously differentiable for all but one value of m. 
[Figure 2 about here] 11 
   Lemma 1:  If 8  e?( a/b)+g1(a1*,â2)-(g
2/b), then as  d˘1 the function  g
d(m) converges 
uniformly to a continuous decreasing function  g*(m) on  (0,1], where  
(9)   
g*(m)  =   max    g1+e  ,   g1(a1*,a2) + 
Amk
1-Abmk k g2*-g2(a1*, a2)      
, 
   
k   =  
a+bg1(a1*,a2)-g2-be
g2*-g2(a1*,a2)   and A =  
g1*-g1(a1*,a2)
g2*-g2-be  . 
Proof:   See Appendix. 
Lemma 1 describes the properties of the equilibria as d˘1.  We have shown that as d˘1 the 
function g*(m) is a good approximation for the payoffs at a PBE of G(m,d).  Moreover, the function 
g*(m) can be made arbitrarily close to g
1 (by varying e) at some strictly positive value of m.  This is 
now used to prove the main result: there exists an equilibrium where the normal type gets a payoff 
arbitrarily close to g
1 for all games where the players are sufficiently patient and the probability of the 
automaton is small. 
 
   Proposition 3:  For any  w>0 there exists a  dw>0 and a  mw>0 such that for any  d, m 
satisfying  1>d>dw and mw>m>0, the game  G(m, d) has a PBE where the normal type of player 
1 receives an expected payoff  g1 within  w of her minmax payoff, that is, satisfying  
g
1<g1<g
1+w. 
Proof:  Let w>0 be given and choose e=w/2 (without loss of generality assume 
be?a+bg1(a1*,â2)-g
2); then, since w>e and using Lemma 1, g*(m)=g
1+w is equivalent to 
    g
1+2e =  g1(a1*,â2)  +  
Amk
1-Abmk
  k(g2*-g2(a1*,â2)). 
After some rearrangement this implies the unique solution for m to g*(m)=g
1+w satisfies 
                                                   
8 This condition is merely to rule out k=0, which would change the method of solving the differential equation 
studied below (but not the conclusion).  Note that k can be negative. 12 
 
Abmk  =  1  -  
a+bg1(a*,a2)-g2-be
a+bg1-g2+be   . 
The quotient is less than unity if and only if k>0, so for all k?0  there is 0<m*<1 that satisfies this 
equation with equality and m<m* if and only if g*(m)<g
1+w.  The functions g
d(m) are non-decreasing 
and converge uniformly to g*(m) so there exists mw<m* and a dw such that provided m<mw and d>dw, 
g
d(m)<g
1+w.  Q.E.D. 
   Remark:  Although Proposition 3 establishes that player 1 can be held close to her worst payoff, it 
is easy to show under the same assumptions that equilibria can be constructed in which she receives 
(approximately) any payoffs between g
1 and g1*: in Proposition 1, in addition to constructing an 
equilibrium with payoffs less than g1, an equilibrium with payoffs equal to g1 can be constructed. 
Using this repeatedly, as d goes to one in Proposition 3, all points to the "left" (see Figure 2) of the 
limiting function, g*(m), can be approximated by equilibria. 
 
3.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
We have shown that small perturbations of a large class of common interest games, in which one of 
the players might be a type committed to playing in a cooperative fashion, do not rule out low payoffs, 
even when sequential rationality is imposed on the equilibrium concept.  In a broader context, these 
results also have implications for the reputation literature following Fudenberg and Levine (1989), 
which considers games between a long-run and a sequence of short-run players, perturbed with the 
possibility that the long-run player might be committed to some fixed action.  Their results were 
extended to games with two long-run players by Schmidt (1993) for "conflicting interest games", and, 
for general stage games, by Cripps et al. (1996).  The latter paper develops a lower bound on the 
Nash equilibrium payoffs of the informed player which is applicable to the class of games studied here, 
but the result applies only if the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed 
player.  It is certainly the case that in some common interest games satisfying our conditions, this 
lower bound is above the informed player's minmax payoff.  Hence our results imply that with 13 
symmetric discounting no such lower bound exists in this class of common interest games, even 
when perfection is imposed.9   
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1:  The players' equilibrium strategies for the game G(mp, d) are described 
below. 
Player 1:   Play a1* with probability q and â1 with probability (1-q) in period zero, where 
q=p(1-m)/(1-pm). 
If player 1's period zero action (a1
0
) was a1*, then from period one play the PBE that 
gives the payoffs (g1,g2) (i.e. deviations by player 2 in period zero are ignored when 
a 1
0
=a1*). 
If (â1,â2) is played in period zero then from period one play a subgame perfect 
equilibrium for G(d) to achieve the payoffs (x,y)￿Ge* (where (x,y) is described below). 
If a1
0
=â1 and a2
0
?â 2, then play out a subgame perfect equilibrium for G(d) that gives 
player 2 a payoff g
2+be. 
Player 2:  Play â2 in period zero. 
If a1
0
=a1*, then play the PBE that gives the payoffs (g1,g2). 
If a1
0
?a 1* (and a2
0
=â2), then play the subgame perfect equilibrium for G(d) to achieve 
the payoffs (x,y)￿Ge*. 
By the corollary to Result 1 we can specify an equilibrium for the game G(d) that gives any payoffs 
(x,y)￿Ge*.  Below we will place some further restrictions on (x,y), but at the moment we will note that 
the pair (x,y) is always restricted to be on the line g2=a+bg1 shown in Figure 1. 
  The players' strategies are optimal after period zero:  The strategy for player 1 requires 
her to randomize in period zero; therefore, at a PBE, player 2's priors conditional on a 1
0
=a1* will be 
revised upwards.  The choice of q above ensures that his revised priors attach probability m to the 
automaton type.  Thus conditional on a 1
0
=a1*, the game G(m, d) is played from period one onwards.  
Since (g1,g2) are by assumption payoffs at a PBE of G(m, d), the strategies described above certainly 15 
consitute an equilibrium given any history with  a1
0=a1*.  Moreover, after any history with a1
0?a 1*, the 
continuation payoffs correspond to equilibria in G(d).10 
  The players' strategies are optimal in period zero:  Player 1's strategy for period zero is 
optimal provided she is indifferent between the actions a1* and â1, and provided all other actions in 
period zero give her a smaller payoff.  She is indifferent between a1* and â1 if (1-d)g
1+dx=(1-
d)g1(a1*,â2)+dg1.  An action a1?a 1* ,â1 gives her a payoff (1-d)g1(a1,â2) +dx, and, by the definition 
of â1,  (1-d)g
1+dx = (1-d)g1(a1,â2)+dx for all a1￿A1.  Indifference between a1* and â1 implies 
(A1)  x = g1 - (1-d)d-1( g
1 - g1(a1*,â2) ). 
But g
1=g1(a1*,â2) and g1=g1*, so (3) and (A1) imply together x￿[g
1+e,g1*].  Thus it is possible to 
find (x,y)￿Ge* so that y=a+bx, and hence the above strategy for player 1 is optimal. 
  Player 2's strategy in period zero is optimal provided his expected payoff from playing â2 
exceeds that from any other action.  He attaches probability pm+(1-pm)q = p to player 1 playing 
action a1* and probability 1-p to her playing â1, and therefore if he plays an action a2
0?â2 his payoff is 
bounded above by (1-d)g2*+d{ pg2+(1-p)(g
2+be)}, whereas his payoff from the action â2 is (1-
d){ pg2(a1*,â2)+(1-p)g
2 }+d{ pg2+(1-p) y }.  Thus his period zero strategy is optimal provided 
(A2) d(y-g
2-be)-(1-d)(g2*-g
2) = p{d(y-g
2-be)-(1-d)(g2*-g
2)+(1-d)(g2*-g2(a1*,â2))}. 
Next, we shall show that the RHS of (A2) is strictly positive, and the LHS is weakly positive and 
smaller than the term in braces on the RHS.  It is sufficient that  d(y-g
2-be)-(1-d)(g2*-g
2)=0 for this 
to be true.  Since y=a+bx and the value of x is determined by (A1), some substitution and 
rearranging of this latter condition gives 
  a+bg1  =  g
2  +  be +  (1-d)d-1{ b( g
1 - g1(a1*,â2) ) + (g2*-g
2) }. 
Make the following substitutions: g
2=a+bx (for some x=g
1), g2*=a+bg1*, and g
2=a+bx (for some 
x<g1*).  Since b>0, by common interests, the above expression now becomes 
(A3)  g1  =  x  +  e +  (1-d)d-1{ ( g
1 - g1(a1*,â2) ) + (g1*-x) }. 
Condition (3) is sufficient for (A3), since 2M>g1*-x, and therefore the RHS of (A2) is strictly positive 
(g2*>g2(a1*,â2)) and the LHS is weakly positive and smaller than the term in braces on the RHS.  
Using this finding,  (A2) is thus equivalent to  
                                                   
10 If a1
0
?a1*, â1, then Bayes' rule does not tie down beliefs, and in this case we assume that probability one is 
put on the normal type; given that the automaton can be thought of as a type for whom it is a dominant strategy 
to play a1*, this is a natural assumption. 16 
(A4) 
p
 1-p 
   Š   
 d(y-g2-be) - (1-d)(g2*-g2) 
  (1-d)(g2*-g2(a1*, a2))  
 
  . 
Again, substitute y=a+bx and for x from (A1), and this gives the condition (4).  We have established 
that the strategies outlined above constitute an equilibrium for the game G(pm,d).  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  If the pairs (mn,gn) n=0,1,...,N(d)+1 are joined with line segments and the 
final pair (mN(d)+1,gN(d)+1) is joined to (0,gN(d)+1) with a line segment, this gives a piecewise-linear 
function gd(m) plotted in (m,g)-space (shown in Figure 2).  The slope of the line segments is given by 
the ratio (gn-gn+1)/(mn-mn+1)= (gd(mn)-gd(mn+1))/(mn-mn+1).  From (5),(6) and (7) the ratio can be 
re-written as follows: 
(A5)
   
 
gd(mn)-gd(mn+1)
mn-mn+1
  
 =   
gd(mn)- (1-d)g1(a1*, a2)+dgd(mn)
mn-pnmn
  
 
=    
gd(mn)-g1(a1*, a2)
mn
d(a+bg d(mn)-g2-be) - (1-d) g2(a1*, a2)-g2+b g1-g1(a1*, a2)
(g2*-g2(a1*, a2))
 
Now restrict the function gd(m) to the interval [h,1].  On this interval the RHS of (A5) has a finite 
upper bound which gives us 
 
gd(mn)-gd(mn+1)
mn-mn+1
   Š    
g1*-g1(a1*,a2) g2*-g2-be  
h g2*-g2(a1*,a2)
. 
Thus the piecewise linear functions gd(m) satisfy a Lipschitz condition and by the Ascoli Theorem 
converge uniformly to a continuous limit as d˘1.  If we let g*(m) denote this limit, then this will also 
be the limit of the step functions described by Proposition 2. 
  Eq. (8) also implies that the function g*(m) is continuously differentiable, provided 
g*(m)>g
1+e.  The RHS of (A5) converges to a continuous finite limit as d˘1, whilst the LHS of (A5) 
converges to dg*/dm.  Thus letting d˘1 we have the differential equation 
dg*
dm
  =  
g*(m)-g1(a1*,a2)
m
a+bg*(m)-g2-be
(g2*-g2(a1*,a2))
 . 
Given e is chosen so that a+bg1(a1*,â2)-g
2?be, this can be solved as follows: 
dg*
g*(m)-g1(a1*, a2) a+bg*(m)-g2-be
  =  
dm
m g2*-g2(a1*, a2)  
, 17 
which can be rewritten as
 
dg*
g*(m)-g1(a1*,a2)
   -   
bdg*
a+bg*(m)-g2-be
   =  
dm a+bg1(a1*,a2)-g2-be
m g2*-g2(a1*,a2)
 
 
. 
Integrating, 
log
g*(m)-g1(a1*, a2)
a+bg*(m)-g2-be
   =  
a+bg1(a1*,a2)-g2-be
g2*-g2(a1*,a2)
log(m)  +  K 
 
. 
By construction g*(1)=g1* and this allows us to determine the arbitrary constant K.  Given the 
assumption a+bg1(a1*,â2)-g
2?be it is now possible to solve the above for g*(m), which gives  
(A6)  g*(m)  =  g1(a1*,â2)  +  
Amk
1-Abmk
  k(g2*-g2(a1*,â2)), 
where  
k   =  
a+bg1(a1*, a2)-g2-be
g2*-g2(a1*,a2)
 ?0 and A =  
g1*-g1(a1*,a2)
g2*-g2-be  >0.  
Again the assumption a+bg1(a1*,â2)-g
2?be is necessary and sufficient for k?0 and since 
(1-bA)(g2*-g
2-be)=k(g2*-g2(a1*,â2), it is also necessary and sufficient for 1-bA?0.  In (A6) if k>0 
then as m˘0 so g*(m)˘g1(a1*,â2)=g
1, whilst if k<0 then g*(m)˘x+e, where a+bx=g
2 and x=g
1.  
Thus the constraint (8) is binding on the sequence (mn,gn).  From (8) as d˘1, so the difference 
|gN(d) - g
1+(1-d)d-1( g
1 - g1(a1*,â2)) + e|˘0 and hence the limit of the points (mn,gn) is the graph of 
the function described in the Lemma restricted to the domain [h,1]. 
The limiting function g*(m) does not depend on h, so as h approaches zero the argument still 
applies, but for h=0 it is possible that there is a limiting discontinuity.  Q.E.D. 
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1.  Even the assumption of two -sided uncertainty of the type we assume does not force 
cooperation in Nash equilibrium.  Aumann & Sorin (1989) construct a mixed-strategy counter 
example (to their main result, which assumes pure strategies) in which cooperation is not 
approximated as the players become patient. 
2.  Formally, it is easy to establish that for a fixed probability of the commitment type, and for a 
given e, there is a threshold discount factor above which all pure-strategy perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium payoffs are within e of the dominant payoff pair.  It should be noted, however, that this 
depends on the assumption that the perturbation only involves the above described automaton. 
 
3.   Bergin (1989) shows that sequential equilibria have a Markov property; unfortunately this result 
does not directly have bearing upon the set of payoffs which can be realised in equilibrium.  The 
same can be said for the results of Kalai and Lehrer (1993) and Jordan (1995) who have studied 
the long-run properties of equilibrium play in contexts more general than the current one. 
 
4.  co(X) denotes the convex hull of the set X. 
 
5.  Assumption (ii) can be relaxed at the cost of some additional complications and an appropriate 
reformulation of Proposition 3.  Assumption (iii) is also not essential; the case where the feasible set 
is one-dimensional was treated in an earlier version, although some of the constructions needed 
differ.  We conjecture that assumption (i) is likewise inessential, although we have not proved this. 
 
6.  The automaton can also be thought of as a type with a standard payoff matrix in which the 
payoffs in the row corresponding to a1* are all equal and strictly greater than all other payoffs.  
At a PBE this type will play a1* after every history, including those off the equilibrium path. 
 
7.   The reader is referred to Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a, 1991b) for formal definitions of all 
equilibrium concepts used here.  For the purpose of the definitions, the automaton should be 
interpreted as a payoff-matrix type as described in footnote 6; the strategy of such a type in a PBE 
must be identical to the automaton strategy.  This is in contrast to a Nash equilibrium where the 
payoff-matrix type need only follow the commitment strategy on the equilibrium path.  In the 19 
equilibria we construct, beliefs off-the-equilibrium path put probability zero on the automaton if 
player 1 has deviated from a1* in the past, which is consistent with the idea of an automaton which 
cannot deviate. 
 
8.   This condition is merely to rule out k=0, which would change the method of solving the 
differential equation studied below (but not the conclusion).  Note that k can be negative. 
 
9   An example is constructed in Celentani et al. (1996) which is similar to the type of construction 
we use, and which establishes that payoffs below the Stackelberg payoff can be sustained in a PBE.  
For their game, however, the Cripps et al. (1996) bound is just the minmax payoff. 
 
10.  If  a1
0
?a1*, â1, then Bayes' rule does not tie down beliefs, and in this case we assume that 
probability one is put on the normal type; given that the automaton can be thought of as a type for 
whom it is a dominant strategy to play a1*, this is a natural assumption. 